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We develop a dynamic panel threshold model of capital structure to test the dynamic trade-off
theory, allowing for asymmetries in firms' adjustments toward target leverage. Our novel
estimation approach is able to consistently estimate heterogeneous speeds of adjustment in
different regimes as well as to properly test for the threshold effect. We consider several proxies
for adjustment costs that affect the asymmetries in capital structure adjustments and find
evidence that firmswith large financing imbalance (or a deficit), large investment or low earnings
volatility adjust faster than those with the opposite characteristics. Firms not only adjust at
different rates but also seem to adjust toward heterogeneous leverage targets. Moreover, we
document a consistent pattern that firms undertaking quick adjustment are over-levered with a
financing deficit and rely heavily on equity issues to make such adjustment.
© 2012 Elsevier B.V.
JEL Classifications:
C12
C33
G32
Keywords:
Capital structure
Target leverage
Dynamic trade-off theory
Dynamic panel threshold model
1. Introduction
Since Modigliani and Miller's (1958) irrelevance propositions, a number of theories have been developed to show that
corporate capital structure does matter in the presence of capital market frictions and imperfections (e.g., corporate and personal
taxes, costly financial distress/bankruptcy, agency problems and information asymmetries). As one of the most dominant views of
capital structure, the trade-off theory focuses on two such frictions, namely taxes and financial distress costs, and argues that
firms have optimal capital structure that balances the tax benefits of debt (i.e., debt interest tax shields) against the costs of
financial distress/bankruptcy.1 The empirical implication follows that in a dynamic framework, corporate leverage should exhibit
mean reversion as firms seek to undertake adjustment toward their target leverage. 2 Hence, a large number of empirical studies
have attempted to examine the validity of the trade-off theory by testing whether and how fast firms move toward target
leverage.
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1 See Kraus and Litzenberger (1973), Brennan and Schwartz (1978) and Bradley et al. (1984) for early static trade-off models; Hennessy and Whited (2006),
Strebulaev (2007) and Titman and Tsyplakov (2007) for recent dynamic trade-off models.
2 There are alternative views of capital structure, such as the pecking order theory (Myers, 1984; Myers and Majluf, 1984), the market timing hypothesis (Baker
and Wurgler, 2002) and the inertia hypothesis (Welch, 2004), which do not predict target leverage and adjustment toward such target. See Harris and Raviv
(1991) and Frank and Goyal (2007) for comprehensive reviews of the capital structure literature.
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Recent empirical research generally documents evidence in favor of firms' (mean-reverting) adjustment toward target
leverage, which is consistent with the trade-off theory. Estimating a linear partial adjustment model of leverage, Ozkan (2001)
and Flannery and Rangan (2006) find that UK and US firms move toward their target leverage reasonably quickly; their
adjustment speeds are estimated at above 50% and 30%, respectively. Antoniou et al. (2008) estimate a similar dynamic model
and provide cross-country evidence of capital structure adjustment for both market-based economies (the UK and the US) and
bank-oriented economies (France, Germany and Japan). 3 However, an important limitation of these studies is that they
(implicitly) assume symmetry in the mechanism of adjustment such that firms adjust at the same rate toward homogeneous
target leverage. Consequently, they do not allow for a possibility that firms facing differential adjustment costs may take different
paths toward their optimal capital structures (e.g., Fischer et al., 1989; Leland, 1994).
Our paper aims to fill this gap in the literature by developing a novel empirical approach to testing the dynamic trade-off
theory, allowing for asymmetric and costly adjustment toward leverage targets. In particular, we propose a dynamic panel
threshold model of leverage, allowing for asymmetries in the mechanism of adjustment for firms in different ‘refinancing regimes’
associated with differential adjustment costs. To illustrate the advantage of our approach, consider a dynamic setting in which a
firm faces different costs of leverage adjustment according to its characteristics and/or its position relative to target leverage.
Rather than having a unique leverage target, the firm may have a target range within which it allows its leverage to vary. Capital
structure adjustment is undertaken only when the costs of such adjustment are outweighed by the benefits of being close to
target leverage (Fischer et al., 1989; Leary and Roberts, 2005). Importantly, the size and speed of the adjustment are dependent
on the deviation of the actual leverage from the target (e.g., Byoun, 2008) and the costs of such adjustment, which in turn are
affected by the degree of financial constraints and flexibility facing the firm (e.g., Faulkender et al., 2012; Flannery and Hankins,
2007). For example, firms with low earnings volatility enjoy a lower cost of capital than those with high volatility, thus suggesting
they should undertake faster adjustment. In this dynamic framework, the conventional linear partial adjustment model adopted
in the literature becomes misspecified while our proposed regime-switching dynamic panel model emerges as a more
appropriate testing approach.
Our paper makes two major contributions to the literature. First, the dynamic panel threshold model of leverage developed in
our paper is capable of directly testing the validity of the dynamic trade-off theory. A few recent empirical studies have examined
the relations between the speed of capital structure adjustment and firm-specific and macroeconomic variables (e.g., Drobetz and
Wanzenried, 2006; Drobetz et al., 2006) and the impact of financial constraints and/or financing gaps on the asymmetry in such
adjustment (e.g., Byoun, 2008; Faulkender et al., 2012; Flannery and Hankins, 2007). This strand of research, however, does not
focus on consistently estimating heterogeneous speeds of adjustment for firms facing differential adjustment costs. Our approach
can consistently estimate heterogeneous adjustment speeds and provide important insights into the characteristics of firms that
follow asymmetric adjustment paths. In addition, our model entertains a possibility that firms not only adjust at heterogeneous
rates (i.e., short-run asymmetry) but also adjust toward heterogeneous leverage targets (i.e., long-run asymmetries). This is an
important advantage over recent research that allows for the asymmetry in the adjustment speed but not in target leverage such
that firms may only undertake asymmetric adjustment toward homogeneous target leverage (Byoun, 2008; Dang et al., 2011;
Faulkender et al., 2012). Dynamic trade-off models generally imply the existence of target leverage ranges (Fischer et al., 1989;
Leary and Roberts, 2005) so there is no clear justification as to why firms in different refinancing regimes should consider a
homogeneous target.
Second, we develop econometric techniques that provide both consistent and efficient estimates of heterogeneous speeds of
adjustment as well as a valid testing procedure for threshold effects in short dynamic panels with unobserved individual firm
fixed-effects. Most recent studies adopt the sample-splitting or dummy variable approach to investigate the (asymmetric)
dynamic trade-off behavior of firms with different characteristics (e.g., Byoun, 2008; Dang et al., 2011; Faulkender et al., 2012;
Flannery and Hankins, 2007). However, this methodology is, at most, arbitrary and is likely to suffer from a sample selection bias
problem (Hansen, 2000). Our proposed dynamic panel threshold model overcomes this limitation because in our framework, the
threshold parameter is consistently estimated within the model rather than being imposed. Our estimation approach extends
static panel threshold modeling (Hansen, 1999) by combining the existing time-series techniques on threshold models (Chan,
1993; Hansen, 2000) and advanced methods for dynamic panels (Alvarez and Arellano, 2003). Specifically, it involves
generalizing the Anderson and Hsiao (1982) instrumental-variable estimator (hereafter AH-IV) and, most importantly, the
Arellano and Bond (1991) generalized methods of moments estimator (hereafter GMM) to a new estimation approach applicable
for dynamic panel threshold models. To test for the threshold effect, we follow Andrews and Ploberger (1994) and Hansen
(1996,1999,2000) and develop a bootstrap-based testing procedure, the validity of which is then supported by Monte Carlo
simulation studies. Further, our approach, based on one-stage estimation is free of generated regressors problems inherent in the
two-stage procedure in which target leverage is estimated in the first stage before the speed of adjustment is estimated in the
second, an approach commonly used in recent studies (Byoun, 2008; Dang et al., 2011; Faulkender et al., 2012).
We consider several firm-specific variables that potentially affect the costs of capital structure adjustment, namely financing
(cash flow) imbalance, growth opportunities, investment (capital expenditures), profitability, firm size and earnings volatility.
Using an unbalanced panel of UK firms over the period 1996–2003, we first document that UK firms adjust relatively fast toward
target leverage. Importantly, we find some evidence of short-run and long-run asymmetries in firms' adjustment mechanisms.
The speed of adjustment is statistically different conditional on financing imbalance, firm investment or earnings volatility
3 Most recent research disagrees about the magnitude of the estimated speed of adjustment, which is sensitive to the econometric procedures employed,
especially in the presence of unobserved ﬁrm ﬁxed-effects in short dynamic panels (e.g., Huang and Ritter, 2009).
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(i.e., short-run asymmetry) but not on the remaining regime-switching variables such as profitability and firm size. Specifically,
firms with large financing imbalance (or a deficit), large investment or low earnings volatility have a significantly faster
adjustment speed than those with the opposite characteristics. Further, we provide new evidence that not only do these firms
adjust at different rates but they also seem to adjust toward heterogeneous leverage targets (i.e., long-run asymmetries). We
observe several important characteristics of firms that have a faster speed of adjustment: they are significantly over-levered with
a financing deficit and a considerably large deviation from target leverage, toward which they revert mainly through equity
issues, rather than debt retirements. This finding suggests that firms tend to make quicker adjustment to avoid the potentially
large financial distress costs caused by having above-target leverage. Taken together, our results are generally consistent with
dynamic trade-off models of capital structure.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a review of the (linear) partial adjustment model of
leverage widely used in the literature and then develops a threshold (non-linear) partial adjustment model specification.
Section 3 discusses the potential determinants of the speed of adjustment to be employed as the transition variable under the
proposed regime-switching framework. Section 4 describes the estimation and testing procedures. Section 5 summarizes the data
and sample, and discusses the empirical results. Section 6 concludes.
2. Dynamic capital structure adjustment models
The conventional econometric specification to model firms' adjustment toward target leverage takes the form of a partial
adjustment process (e.g., Flannery and Rangan, 2006):
Δ‘it ¼ δ ‘it−‘i;t−1
 
þ vit ; ð1Þ
where ‘it and ‘it denote the actual (observed) and target leverage ratios for firm i at time t, respectively. vit is an error component,
the details of which will be specified later. δ is the speed of adjustment that measures how fast firms move toward their target
leverage. This coefficient is expected to lie between 0 and 1, with a higher value indicating a faster speed of adjustment. 4
There are two approaches to dealing with the unobserved target leverage in (1). First, target leverage can be proxied by the
mean or the moving average of the actual (observed) leverage. The drawback of this approach lies in the difficulty to justify why
target leverage should remain constant over time or only depend on past leverage decisions (Shyam-Sunder and Myers, 1999).
Second, target leverage can be considered as a unique ratio determined by firms' characteristics as follows:
‘

it ¼ β′xit ; ð2Þ
where xit denotes the k×1 vector of exogenous factors determining target leverage with β being the structural parameters.
Here, we follow the literature and consider the five most commonly-used determinants of leverage, namely (asset) tangibility,
growth opportunities, non-debt tax shields, profitability and firm size (Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Ozkan, 2001; Lemmon et al.,
2008).
In estimating Eq. (1) together with Eq. (2), there are two approaches available. The first is a two-stage procedure (Byoun,
2008; Fama and French, 2002; Shyam-Sunder and Myers, 1999), in which one regresses actual leverage on the firm-specific
characteristics in Eq. (2), obtains the fitted values ‘^it ¼ β^ ′xit (with β^ being the consistent estimate of β) and then uses this proxy
for target leverage, ‘it , in (1). The most important limitation of this estimation approach is that it suffers from a generated
regressors problem (Pagan, 1984), in which inference in the second-stage regression is likely to be invalid. 5 This becomes
potentially more problematic in dynamic threshold models where it can affect both estimation and testing of threshold effects
and the speeds of adjustment. For this reason, the two-stage procedure is not employed in this paper and we now turn to an
alternative approach, namely, the one-stage procedure (Flannery and Rangan, 2006; Ozkan, 2001), in which Eq. (2) is substituted
into Eq. (1) to yield: 6
‘it ¼ ϕ‘i;t−1 þ π′xit þ vit ; ð3Þ
where ϕ=1−δ and π=δβ. Here, we follow the literature (e.g., Ozkan, 2001) and model vit as an one-way error component that
includes the individual firm fixed effects, as follows:
vit ¼ αi þ eit :
4 Recent research considers alternative speciﬁcations. For example, Lemmon et al. (2008) employ the initial leverage, ‘i;0 instead of ‘i;t−1. Alternatively, Huang
and Ritter (2009) use the long-differencing estimator based on the following equation:
‘it−‘i;t−k ¼ δ ‘it−‘i;t−k
 þ vit ; k > 1;
which alleviates the problem of weak instruments and relies on a smaller set of moment conditions, so that its small-sample performance is arguably more
reliable than the standard GMM estimators (Hahn et al., 2007).
5 Previous research estimating the partial adjustment model in two stages has largely ignored this issue (e.g., Byoun, 2008; Fama and French, 2002).
6 We would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for this important suggestion.
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The firm fixed effects, αi, may capture (unobserved) firm-specific characteristics such as managerial ability and skills, the level
of competition in the industry and the life cycle of products. eit is the well-behaved error term with a zero mean and constant
variance. Note that by using Eq. (3), both the short-run dynamics, ϕ^, and the long-run coefficients, β^ ¼ π^
1−ϕ^
, can be jointly
estimated in one stage. Hence, this approach does not suffer from the generated regressors problem that affects estimation
precision and inference of the aforementioned two-stage approach.
Testing trade-off models using Eq. (3) assumes that firms undertake capital structure adjustments in a symmetric fashion. In
the presence of costly adjustment, however, this assumption is no longer valid because leverage changes are infrequent and tend
to occur at ‘restructuring points’ (Fischer et al., 1989; Leary and Roberts, 2005; Titman and Tsyplakov, 2007). Firms adjust at
different rates according to the position of their actual leverage relative to targets as well as the costs of their adjustment
(e.g., Byoun, 2008; Faulkender et al., 2012). To capture this dynamic trade-off behavior, we develop the regime-switching,
dynamic threshold model: 7
‘it ¼ ϕ1‘i;t−1 þ π′1xit
 
1 qit≤cf g þ ϕ2‘i;t−1 þ π
′
2xit
 
1 qit≤cightf g þ νit ð4Þ
where 1{⋅} is an indicator function taking the value 1 if the event is true and 0 otherwise.Model (4) represents an important extension
of the (linear) partial adjustment model, (3) in that it allows for short-run asymmetries in two AR(1) parameters (ϕ1 and ϕ2), the
implied speeds of adjustment (δ1=1−ϕ1 and δ2=1−ϕ2), and the short run coefficients (π1 and π2) as well as long-run
asymmetries in the target leverage relationships (β1 and β2), conditional on the (regime-switching) transition variable, qit, and the
threshold parameter, c. For simplicity, the transition variable, qit, is assumed to be stationary and exogenous.
The threshold partial adjustment model given by Eq. (4) has at least four advantages over the simple sample-splitting or dummy
variable (two-stage) approaches to examining asymmetries in dynamic capital structure adjustments (Byoun, 2008; Dang et al.,
2011; Faulkender et al., 2012). First, the exogenous sample-splittingmethod requires an arbitrary choice of known threshold a priori,
such as the median, quartiles or quintiles. 8 Our proposed approach overcomes this limitation because it allows the threshold
parameter to be estimated within the model. Second, unlike the approach using dummies or sub-samples where firms are typically
classified into a regime over the entire sample period, our model allows firms to switch regime over-time conditional on the proxies
for adjustment costs. Finally, unlike the two-stage approach commonly used in recent research (Byoun, 2008; Dang et al., 2011;
Faulkender et al., 2012), our one-stage estimation approach based on Eq. (4) does not suffer from the generated regressors problem
and the resulting estimation and inference complexities, especially in dynamic panels. Finally, our one-stage approach allows for
complex adjustment mechanisms whereby firms may not only adjust at heterogeneous rates (short-run asymmetry) but also adjust
toward heterogeneous leverage targets (long-run asymmetries). This is an important advantage over the two-stage procedure that
implicitly imposes homogeneous target leverage relations (long-run symmetries). Thus, our approach can entertain several
intermediate scenarios from symmetries in target leverage relations and the speed of adjustment to asymmetries in both in a flexible
manner.
3. Determinants of the speed of capital structure adjustment
In this section, we examine a number of candidates for the transition variable, q, in our regime-switching framework, Eq. (4).
While a large body of capital structure research investigates the explanatory power of firm-specific or macro-economic factors
determining target leverage (see Frank and Goyal (2007) for a review), the literature is relatively silent on the potential
determinants of the speed of leverage adjustment. Our discussion is motivated by a few of recent empirical studies on costly
adjustment (e.g., Byoun, 2008; Dang et al., 2011; Drobetz et al., 2006; Faulkender et al., 2012; Flannery and Hankins, 2007; Leary
and Roberts, 2005).
In adjusting leverage toward the target, firms have the following options. They can issue new debt and/or repurchase existing
shares when they have above-target leverage; they can issue new equity and/or retire debt when they have below-target leverage
(e.g., Flannery and Hankins, 2007). In addition, firms can make leverage adjustment internally by keeping profits as retained
earnings or pay out as dividends. Overall, the speed with which firms adjust leverage is determined by the adjustment costs,
financial flexibility and constraints that they face. In what follows, we turn to discuss the (asymmetric) mechanisms in which
these factors affect the speed of leverage adjustment.
7 Alternatively, one can adopt the two-stage estimation procedure outlined above and estimates the following dynamic threshold model in the second stage:
Δ‘it ¼ δ1 ‘^it−‘it−1
 
1 qit≤cf g þ δ2 ‘^it−‘it−1
 
1 qit>cf g þwit ; i ¼ 1;…;N; t ¼ 2;…; T : where ‘^it is estimated from: ‘it ¼ ‘it þ uit ¼ β′xit þ uit : However, as in the linear
model, this approach suffers from the generated regressors problem in a complex manner, unless the strong assumption of independence between the errors, wit
and uit is maintained. Further, this approach also imposes the restriction of long-run symmetries such that the long-run relations between target leverage and its
determinants remain the same even when ﬁrms are in different regimes.
8 For example, (Byoun, 2008) uses dummy variables to distinguish between ﬁrms having a ﬁnancing surplus or a deﬁcit and/or above- or below-target
leverage. This clearly involves a certain degree of arbitrariness since the threshold parameters are imposed instead of being consistently estimated within the
model.
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3.1. Financing imbalance (deﬁcit/surplus)
Firms that have to cover substantial cash flow deficits or surpluses by changing their debt and equity mix may face potentially
lower costs of leverage adjustment because a proportion of the adjustment costs is ‘shared’ with transaction costs (Faulkender
et al., 2012). 9 These firms are thus expected to have a quick speed of adjustment. The sign of the financing imbalance also has
important implications for firms' adjustment speeds (Dang et al., 2011). Specifically, when firms have a financing deficit, they are
under considerable pressure to offset this deficit by issuing debt, equity or both securities. Yet, such external financing activities
may provide an opportunity for these firms to choose an appropriate debt-equity mix to move toward their target leverage. On
the other hand, when firms have a cash flow surplus, they are under relatively less pressure to address this imbalance, implying
less incentive for them to undertake leverage adjustment. However, these firmsmay find it easier to adjust toward target leverage
because the costs of retiring debt and/or repurchasing equity (in the presence of a deficit) may be lower than the costs of issuing
those securities (in the presence of a surplus). Since the above two predictions are conflicting, the relation between firms'
financing imbalance and the speed of adjustment will be resolved empirically.
3.2. Growth opportunities
The impact of growth opportunities on firms' adjustment speeds is theoretically ambiguous. First, high-growth firms are likely
to be young and adopt a low-leverage policy to control the under-investment problem (Myers, 1977). They may also have low
profitability and limited internal funds, and rely heavily on external (equity) financing to fund growth opportunities. Through
frequent visits to the external capital markets, these firms can adjust leverage more easily by appropriately altering the mix of
debt and equity (Drobetz et al., 2006). Low-growth firms, on the other hand, tend to rely more on internal finance, so any capital
structure changes are likely to take the form of internal adjustment, the scope and magnitude of which is limited by the size of
internal funds. Hence, the speed of adjustment is expected to be relatively faster for high-growth firms than for their low-growth
counterparts. However, an opposite prediction can be made. Many low-growth firms are mature, cash-rich and highly profitable
so that they may maintain a high-leverage policy to mitigate the free cash flow problem (Jensen, 1986). While low-growth firms
do not rely on external (equity) financing as much as high-growth firms, they face less severe asymmetric information and agency
problems, making it less costly to adjust toward target leverage. Further, low-growth firms with typically high leverage may find
it more beneficial to quickly revert to target leverage in order to avoid potentially high financial distress and bankruptcy costs.
3.3. Investment
Corporate investments have important effects on both financing decisions (Lang et al., 1996) and adjustment toward optimal
capital structure (Flannery and Hankins, 2007) because capital expenditures tend to be mainly funded by internally generated
cash flow (Myers, 1984). As a result, high-growth firms with new investments financed with internal funds may have less scope
left for (internal) capital structure adjustments (e.g., dividend payments, debt retirements or equity repurchases), implying a
slower speed of adjustment for these firms. However, it can be also argued that firms facing large investment opportunities may
resort to external finance, which may present themwith an opportunity to change their capital structure mix appropriately given
that the cost of adjustment can be ‘shared’ with the cost of raising external funds (Faulkender et al., 2012).
3.4. Proﬁtability
Profitable firms are likely to have available retained earnings so they may not suffer from severe (internal) financial
constraints and be able to issue securities at a low cost. In addition, these firms have incentive to take advantage of debt interest
tax shields and minimize the asset substitution effect, especially when they are under-levered. 10 Taken together, firms with high
profitability are likely to enjoy financial flexibility and adjustment benefits, and, thus, are able to make quicker adjustment toward
target leverage. On the other hand, firms with low profitability tend to have limited internal funds and consequently face financial
instability and (internal) constraints, which prevent them frommaking rapid leverage adjustment. This suggests that profitability
has a positive effect on the speed of adjustment. However, an opposite prediction can be made. Less profitable firms are typically
highly levered, as predicted by the pecking order theory (Myers and Majluf, 1984) or dynamic trade-off models (e.g., Strebulaev,
2007), as well as suggested by previous empirical results in the literature (e.g., Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Titman and Wessels,
1988). Since high leverage may result in potentially large financial distress costs, firms with low profitability should have more
incentive to revert to their target leverage quickly, implying a negative impact of profitability on the speed of adjustment.
9 A ﬁrm's ﬁnancing (cash ﬂow) deﬁcit or surplus can be calculated as dividend payments plus net investment and changes in working capital less operating
cash ﬂows after interest and taxes (Shyam-Sunder and Myers, 1999). See also Table 2.
10 For under-levered ﬁrms, retained proﬁts increase the value of equity, resulting in a lower leverage ratio and further deviation from target leverage, implying
greater incentive for these ﬁrms to revert toward the target.
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3.5. Size
Capital structure adjustments generally involve substantial transaction costs (e.g., brokerage fees for new issues), of which the
fixed component is relatively smaller for large firms. Further, large firms are typically mature with high tangibility, profitability
and financial flexibility, implying less severe asymmetric information, adverse selection and moral hazard problems, as well as
better access to capital markets. Hence, the cost of external financing is smaller for large firms, suggesting a quicker speed of
adjustment for them (Drobetz and Wanzenried, 2006). On the other hand, large firms tend to use public debt that is more
expensive to adjust, while they have less cash flow volatility, lower financial distress costs and fewer debt covenants. Thus, they
have less incentive and external pressure to adjust capital structure, implying a slower adjustment speed for large firms (Flannery
and Rangan, 2006).
3.6. Volatility
Under the trade-off framework, firms with volatile earnings have difficulty borrowing because in bad states of the world, they
may generate low earnings that are insufficient for them to meet debt obligations (Antoniou et al., 2008). Put it differently, firms
with high earnings volatility may have limited access to the capital markets to make capital structure adjustments. The
implication follows that earnings volatility and the speed of adjustment are inversely related.
4. Econometric methodology
4.1. Threshold partial adjustment models
In this subsection, we derive the GMM estimators and describe how the threshold parameter is estimated and its confidence
intervals are constructed. The fixed-effects (hereafter FE) estimates of ϕ1 and ϕ2 in Eq. (4) are biased downward because the
regressors are correlated with the (unobserved) firm fixed effects, αi, via the correlation between ‘i;t−1 and vit, i.e., E ‘i;t−1vit
 
≠0
(Nickell, 1981). This suggests that the FE estimator of the speeds of adjustment, δ1=1−ϕ1 and δ2=1−ϕ2, is biased upward.
Note that the FE estimator of π1 and π2 are also biased.
To address this issue, we follow the literature and consider using instrumental variable estimators and, more importantly,
GMM. Despite a large literature on GMM in linear dynamic panels (Arellano and Bond, 1991; Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell
and Bond, 1998), there has been no rigorous research investigating threshold mechanisms in dynamic panel models. Here, we
extend Hansen's (1999) estimation and inference theory for static panel threshold models and propose a new estimation and
testing procedure for the dynamic case. Specifically, we combine time series techniques on threshold modeling (Caner and
Hansen, 2004; Chan, 1993; Hansen, 2000) with the existing GMM literature (Alvarez and Arellano, 2003).
We first rewrite Eq. (4) as:
‘it ¼ ϕ1‘1i;t−1 cð Þ þ π′1x1it cð Þ
n o
þ ϕ2‘2i;t−1 cð Þ þ π′2x2it cð Þ
n o
þ vit ; vit ¼ αi þ eit ; ð5Þ
where ‘1i;t−1 cð Þ ¼ ‘i;t−11 qit≤cf g, ‘2i;t−1 cð Þ ¼ ‘i;t−11 qit>cf g, x1it(c)=xit1{qit≤ c} and x2it(c)=xit1{qit> c}. Next, to deal with the correlation
between the regressors and the firm fixed effects in Eq. (4), we use the first-difference transformation of Eq. (5):
Δ‘it ¼ ϕ1Δ‘1i;t−1 cð Þ þ π′1Δx1it cð Þ
n o
þ ϕ2Δ‘2i;t−1 cð Þ þ π′2Δx2it cð Þ
n o
þ Δeit ; i ¼ 1;…;N; t ¼ 2;…; T; ð6Þ
which is free of the fixed effects αi. However, applying the pooled OLS estimator to Eq. (6) still produces biased estimates since
Δ‘1i;t−1 cð Þ andΔ‘2i;t−1 cð Þ are correlated with Δeit. Hence, we need to find instruments forΔ‘1i;t−1 cð Þ andΔ‘2i;t−1 cð Þ that satisfy the
orthogonal condition with Δeit. Two obvious candidates for these instruments are ‘1i;t−2 cð Þ and ‘2i;t−2 cð Þ, as commonly used in the
(just-identified) instrumental variable estimation approach (hereafter AH-IV) (Anderson and Hsiao, 1982). 11
To improve the efficiency of the AH-IV estimator, we follow (Arellano and Bond, 1991) and consider lagged values of
‘1i;t−2 cð Þ and ‘2i;t−2 cð Þ as additional instruments for Δ‘1i;t−1 cð Þ and Δ‘2i;t−1 cð Þ in (6). We next construct the full GMM instrument
matrices for Δ‘1i;t−1 cð Þ and Δ‘2i;t−1 cð Þ, denoted W1i(c) and W2i(c), respectively for i=1,…,N and j=1,2:
Wji cð Þ ¼
‘ji1 cð Þ 0 ⋯ 0
0 ‘ji1 cð Þ; ‘ji2 cð Þ ⋯ 0
⋮ ⋮ ⋱ ⋮
0 0 ⋯ ‘ji1 cð Þ; ‘ji2 cð Þ; ⋯; ‘ji;T−2 cð Þ
2
664
3
775: ð7Þ
11 Note that the correlation between Δ‘1i;t−1 cð Þ and Δ‘2i;t−1 cð Þ is most likely to be negligible as the transition probability from one regime to the other can be
relatively small. More importantly, the level instruments, ‘1i;t−1 cð Þ and ‘2i;t−1 cð Þ, are orthogonal. Hence, there are no restrictions imposed on the correlation
structure within the instruments.
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We express Eq. (6) in the matrix form as follows:
Δ‘ ¼ Z1 cð Þθ1 þ Z2 cð Þθ2 þ Δe ¼ Z cð Þθþ Δe; ð8Þ
where Z1 cð Þ ¼ Δ‘1;−1 cð Þ;ΔX1 cð Þ
 
, Z2 cð Þ ¼ Δ‘2;−1 cð Þ;ΔX2 cð Þ
 
, Z cð Þ ¼ Z1 cð Þ;Z2 cð Þð Þ, θ1=(ϕ1,π′1)′, θ2=(ϕ2,π′2)′, θ=(θ′1,θ′2)′,
Δ‘ ¼ Δ‘′1;…;Δ‘′N
 
′, Δ‘i ¼ Δ‘i2;…;Δ‘iTð Þ′,Δ‘j;−1 cð Þ ¼ Δ‘′j1;−1 cð Þ;…;Δ‘′jN;−1 cð Þ
 
′, Δ‘ji;−1 cð Þ ¼ Δ‘ji1 cð Þ;…;Δ‘ji;T−1 cð Þ
 ′, ΔXj cð Þ ¼
ΔX ′j1 cð Þ;…;ΔX′jN cð Þ
 
′, and ΔXji cð Þ ¼ Δxji2 cð Þ;…;ΔxjiT cð Þ
 
′ for j=1,2.
Under the maintained assumption that the K×1 vector of covariates, xit , is exogenous with respect to eit, we can construct the
associated instrument matrix for Z cð Þ in Eq. (8) as the following N(T−2)×{(T−2)(T−1)+2K} matrix: 12
W cð Þ ¼
W1 cð Þ
⋮
WN cð Þ
2
4
3
5;Wi cð Þ ¼ W1i cð Þ;ΔX1i cð Þ;W2i cð Þ;ΔX2i cð Þð Þ; i ¼ 1;…;N: ð9Þ
By employing the moment conditions, E WðcÞ′Δe
h i
¼ 0 with Δe ¼ Δe′1;…;Δe′N
 ′ and Δei ¼ Δei3;…;ΔeiTð Þ′, we obtain a GMM
estimator of θ (given a threshold parameter value, c) as:
θ^ cð Þ ¼ Z cð Þ′W cð ÞV cð Þ−1W cð Þ′Z cð Þ
h i−1
Z cð Þ′W cð ÞV cð Þ−1W cð ÞΔ‘
h i
: ð10Þ
The standard GMM theory suggests that an optimal (inverted) weighting matrix, denoted V cð Þ, be given by the covariance
matrix of the orthogonality conditions, E W cð Þ′Δe
h i
¼ 0.
Next, we derive the GMM estimator in two cases, with homoscedasticity or heteroscedasticity, respectively. First, if eit is
independent and has homoscedastic variance, σ 2, across firms and over time, the GMM estimator can be simply computed in one
step (Arellano and Bond, 1991). The covariance matrix of E W cð Þ′Δe
h i
¼ 0 is given by:
E Wi cð Þ′ΔeiΔe′iWi cð Þ
h i
¼ σ2Wi cð Þ′GWi cð Þ; ð11Þ
where G is a (T−2)×(T−2) fixed matrix with 2's on the main diagonal, -1's on the next sub-diagonals, and zeros otherwise.
Thus, we obtain the one-step GMM estimator by:
θ^GMM1 cð Þ ¼ Z cð Þ
′W cð ÞV^GMM1 cð Þ
−1W cð Þ′Z cð Þ
h i−1
Z cð Þ′W cð ÞV^GMM1 cð Þ
−1W cð Þ′Δ‘
h i
; ð12Þ
where V^GMM1 cð Þ ¼∑
N
i¼1Wi cð Þ′GWi cð Þ.
If eit is heteroscedastic, however, the one-step GMM estimator outlined above is inefficient (Arellano and Bond, 1991). In this
more general case, we consider the following robust estimator of the covariance matrix (Arellano, 2003, p.89):
V^GMM2 cð Þ ¼
XN
i¼1
Wi cð Þ′Δe^ i cð ÞΔe^ i cð Þ′Wi cð Þ; ð13Þ
where Δe^ i cð Þ ¼ Δ‘i−Zi cð Þθ^GMM1 cð Þ is the (T−2)×1 vector of residuals obtained from the one-step GMM estimation. We then
obtain an efficient two-step GMM estimator by: 13
θ^GMM2 cð Þ ¼ Z cð Þ
′W cð ÞV^GMM2 cð Þ
−1W cð Þ′Z cð Þ
h i−1
Z cð Þ′W cð ÞV^GMM2 cð Þ
−1W cð Þ′Δ‘
h i
: ð14Þ
Next, the threshold parameter, c, can be consistently estimated as follows:
c^ ¼ argmin
c∈C
Q cð Þ; ð15Þ
12 In the case where xit 's are weakly or strictly exogenous, one can in theory use xi1;…; xiTð Þ or xi1;…; xit−1ð Þ as additional instruments. In our empirical analysis,
we do not consider these instruments to avoid the over-ﬁtting bias problem.
13 In principle, we may consider iterated or continuously updated GMM estimators as follows. First, we obtain the updated weighting matrix, V^GMMu cð Þ, in
Eq. (13) by using the updated residuals, Δe^i
u cð Þ ¼ Δ‘i−Zi cð Þθ^GMM2 cð Þ. Then, we obtain θ^uGMM cð Þ by substituting V^GMMu cð Þ into Eq. (14). This iterative procedure will
continue until convergence, and in theory should be more efﬁcient. In our empirical analysis, we ﬁnd that the difference between θ^GMM2 and the iterative
estimator is mostly negligible, mainly because we only employ linear moment conditions. Hence, to save computation time, we focus on reporting the results
based on θ^GMM2 . Of course, when employing additional (nonlinear) moment conditions as suggested by (Ahn and Schmidt, 1995, 1997), the iterative estimator
will be likely to produce more efﬁcient results, though such extensions are beyond the scope of the paper both theoretically and computationally. We thank a
reviewer for this suggestion.
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where C is the grid set and Q(c) is the generalized distance measure, given by:
Q cð Þ ¼ 1
N
W cð Þ′Δe^ cð Þ
 	
′ 1
N
V^
GMM2
cð Þ
 	−1 1
N
W cð Þ′Δe^ cð Þ
 	
; ð16Þ
where Δe^ cð Þ ¼ Δ‘−Z cð Þθ^GMM2 cð Þ. Since the model is linear in θ for each c, we use a practical grid search algorithm to find a
consistent threshold estimate, c^, over a grid set that consists of the support of the transition variable, q. Following the literature,
we use two cut-off points at the 15th and 85th percentiles to avoid potential extreme values of the transition variable while
ensuring there is a sufficient number of observations in each regime.
Chan (1993) shows that under the assumption of exogenous transition variables, the threshold estimate, c^, is super-consistent,
though its asymptotic distribution is complex and depends on nuisance parameters, which is not useful for inference in practice.
Hansen (2000) suggests to construct a confidence interval for c by forming a non-rejection region using the LR statistic. Under the
assumption that λn=θ2−θ1=bN−η with b≠0 and 0b η b 12, it is shown that N
1−2η c^−cð Þ→dwϒ, where w is a scaling factor and
the distribution function for ϒ is known. As λn tends to zero, the rate of convergence is reduced but a simpler asymptotic
distribution for c^ can be derived, see also Caner and Hansen (2004). In particular, Hansen (1999) shows that an analytic inverse
form of the asymptotic distribution of the LR statistic can be given by−2log 1−
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1−α
p 
. In this case, the critical values are 6.53,
7.35 and 10.5 for α=10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. Next, the confidence interval for c^, denoted Cα=[cL,cH], will be selected from
the grid set, C, such that the LR statistics evaluated at Cα are smaller than the critical value (crit) at the α-significance level.
Under the maintained assumption that the transition variable, qit, is stationary and exogenous, the GMM estimators of θ(c) are
asymptotically independent of the threshold estimate such that inference on θ can proceed as if c^ were the true value, e.g., Hansen
(1999, 200) and (Caner and Hansen, 2004). Hence, it is easily seen that the asymptotic distribution of θ^GMM2 c^ð Þ is normal with the
covariance matrix estimated by:
Vˆar θ^GMM2 c^ð Þ
 
¼ Z c^ð Þ′W c^ð ÞV^GMM2 c^ð Þ
−1W c^ð Þ′Z c^ð Þ
h i−1
: ð17Þ
4.2. Testing for threshold effects
4.2.1. Bootstrap-based testing procedure
In this subsection, we propose a bootstrap-based procedure to test the null hypothesis of no threshold effect (one regime) in
Eq. (4) against the alternative hypothesis of a threshold effect (two regimes) by extending the Hansen (1999) procedure. The null
hypothesis of no threshold effect (θ1=θ2) is given by:
H0 : Rθ ¼ 0; ð18Þ
where R ¼ IKþ1;−IKþ1½ . We then construct the Wald statistic by:
W c^ð Þ ¼ Rθ^ c^ð Þ
n o
′
R Vˆar θ^ c^ð Þ
 
R′
n o−1
Rθ^ c^ð Þ
n o
; ð19Þ
where θ^ is the GMM estimator. Since the threshold parameter is not identified under the null of no threshold effect, Eq. (18), the
testing procedure is nonstandard (e.g., Andrews and Ploberger, 1994, 1996; Davies, 1987; Hansen, 1996). Thus, a natural test
statistic for H0 is given by:
supW ¼ sup
c∈C
W cð Þ:
Given that the model is linear in θ for each c, the Wald statistic is computed in a straightforward manner using the asymptotic
variance estimate formula (17). However, the limiting distribution of supW is not asymptotically pivotal and its critical values
cannot be tabulated.
Hansen (1996, 1999) suggests to use bootstrap techniques to obtain a valid asymptotic p-value of the Wald statistic. Following
this approach, we first estimate Eq. (6) under the alternative hypothesis, and save the residuals, Δe^it c^ð Þ, and the Wald statistic,
W c^ð Þ. We collect the residuals in Δe^ i ¼ Δe^i3 c^ð Þ;…;Δe^iT c^ð Þð Þ′, and Δe^ ¼ Δe^1;…;Δe^Nð Þ. We next consider the DGP under the null,
estimate the null model, (3) by the two-step GMM and save the parameter estimates by ~ϕ; ~π
 
. Assuming that the initial values,
‘i1 and ‘i2, and xit are given, we generate the bth bootstrap samples of lit under H0 as follows:
‘
bð Þ
it ¼
‘it
‘
bð Þ
i;t−1
þ Δ‘ bð Þit
t ¼ 1;2
t≥3 ; b ¼ 1;…;B;
(
ð20Þ
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where
Δ‘ bð Þit ¼ ~ϕΔ‘ b
ð Þ
i;t−1 þ ~π ′Δxit þ Δe b
ð Þ
it ;
and Δeit
(b) are the bth bootstrap samples of Δeit obtained by re-sampling from Δe^ with replacement. Next, using the bootstrap
samples, ‘ bð Þit , we re-estimate the model under the alternative hypothesis, (6), and evaluate the Wald statistic by:
W c^ð Þ bð Þ ¼ Rθ^ bð Þ c^ð Þ
n o
′
RVˆar θ^ bð Þ c^ð Þ
 
R′
n o
Rθ^ bð Þ c^ð Þ
n o
; b ¼ 1;…;B: ð21Þ
Repeating this procedure B times, the bootstrap-based p-value of the statistic is evaluated by: 14
p−value ¼ 1
B
XB
b¼1
1 W c^ð Þ bð Þ > W c^ð Þ
n o
: ð22Þ
The null hypothesis in Eq. (18) is rejected if this p-value is smaller than the significance level.
Finally, under the assumption that qit is exogenous such that the GMM estimators of θ(c) are asymptotically independent of c^,
we note that the bootstrap-based inference for the threshold effect described above should attain the first-order asymptotic
distribution, and thus the p-values are asymptotically valid (e.g., Andrews and Ploberger, 1994; Hansen, 1996, 1999).
4.2.2. Monte Carlo simulation studies
Here, we conduct Monte Carlo simulation studies in order to investigate the finite-sample performance of the bootstrap-based
inference as described above. The data generating process for leverage, ‘it , is based on the threshold partial adjustment
model:
Δ‘it ¼ δ1 ‘it−‘i;t−1
 
1 qit≤cf g þ δ2 ‘

it−‘i;t−1
 
1 qit>cf g þ αi þ eit ; ð23Þ
where target leverage is constructed as a non-linear function of a scalar covariate, xit:
‘

it ¼ β1xit1 qit≤cf g þ β2xit1 qit>cf g; i ¼ 1;…;N; t ¼ 1;…; T ; ð24Þ
Combining (23) and (24), we obtain:
‘it ¼ ϕ1‘i;t−1 þ π1xit
 
1 qit≤cf g þ ϕ2‘i;t−1 þ π2xit
 
1 qit>cf g þ αi þ eit ; ð25Þ
where ϕj=1−δj and πj=δjβj for j=1,2. Next, we construct the covariate, xit as a stationary AR(1) process:
xit ¼ ρxi;t−1 þ uit ; ð26Þ
where |ρ|b1 and a transition variable by:
qit ¼ μq þ vit : ð27Þ
We further impose the following restrictions. xit and qit are exogenously generated such that E uiteit½  ¼ 0, E uitvit½  ¼ 0 and
E viteit½  ¼ 0. uit and vit follow i.i.d. normal distributions, such that uit∼ iidN(0,σu2) and vit∼ iidN(0,σv2). To allow for
heteroscedasticity over time and across cross-section, we assume that eit follows an ARCH(1) process (Everaert and Pozzi,
2007):
eit ¼ h1=2it ξit ; hit ¼ ω þ ae2i;t−1; ξit∼iidN 0;1ð Þ: ð28Þ
The initial value of eit can be obtained from the stationary distribution of eit such that ei1 ¼ ω1−a
 1=2ξi1 and ξi1∼ iidN(0,1).
A special case of homoscedastic errors is obtained by imposing a=0 such that eit=ω1/2ξit. Unobserved individual effects,
αi are assumed to be uniformly distributed, i.e., αi∼U(−α,α). Assume that Var(αi) is proportional to σe2 such that Var(αi)=
α2/3=κσe2, and so α ¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
3κ
p
σe > 0. 15
Throughout the simulations, we fix ‘i0 ¼ 0 and generate T+10 time period observations and then discard the first 10
observations to reduce the potential effects of starting values. We consider N={100,200} and set the parameters
(δ1,β1,ρ,μp,σu,σv,κ)=(0.5,1,0.5,0,1,1,3). We set the number of replications at 1000, and the number of bootstrap iterations
14 An alternative approach is to construct the supW statistic, say supW(b), from the bootstrapped sample and evaluate the bootstrap p-value by the frequencies of
supW(b) that exceed the sample statistic, supW.
15 κ=1 implies that the individual effects are uniformly distributed over −
ﬃﬃﬃ
3
p
;
ﬃﬃﬃ
3
p 
. We have also considered cases with larger or smaller ranges and obtained
qualitatively similar simulation results.
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at 100 per each estimation of (25). We estimate the threshold model (25) by the two-step GMM estimator described in
Section 4.1.
Table 1 reports the simulation results for the empirical frequencies of the bootstrap-based Wald statistic rejecting the null
hypothesis of no threshold effect at the 1% and the 5% significance levels. The empirical sizes of the tests, reported in the row with
(δ2,β2)=(0.5,1.0), are reasonably close to the nominal levels for all cases considered, irrespective of the presence of
heteroscedasticity. Importantly, we find that the power of the tests increases monotonically with the absolute difference between
the parameter values. For example, when |δ1−δ2|≥0.2 and |β1−β2|≥0.2, the power reaches unity as N=200. Interestingly, we
find that the power of the tests becomes slightly asymmetric near the null hypothesis, showing that the test becomes slightly
more powerful when δ2b0.5 (relatively slow adjustment) than when δ2>0.5 (relatively fast adjustment), though such difference
will become negligible when |δ1−δ2|>0.1. 16 In sum, the above Monte Carlo simulation results clearly demonstrate that the
empirical size and power performance of the bootstrap-based inference is highly reliable in finite samples, the size of which is
typically encountered in empirical capital structure studies.
5. Data and empirical results
5.1. Data and sample selection
We investigate a panel of UK firms collected from the Datastream database. Using Datastream's research sample (comprising
Comma required: 1,683 firms), we collected company accounting data from the earliest possible year to January 2004 and
constructed an unbalanced panel of nearly 20,000 firm-year observations. Following previous studies (e.g., Antoniou et al., 2008;
Dang, 2011; Ozkan, 2001), we applied a number of standard data restrictions. First, firms operating in financial sectors (banks,
insurance and life assurance companies and investment trusts) and in utility sectors (electricity, water and gas) were excluded
since they are subject to different accounting considerations. Second, in order to use the GMM estimators that require lagged
instruments, only firms with at least five years of observations were retained (Arellano and Bond, 1991). Finally, observations that
have missing data were removed. 17 Our final sample consists of 859 companies and Comma required: 5,393 firm-year
observations, with the longest time series of 8 years over the period 1996–2003. The definitions and summary statistics for the
variables under consideration are provided in Tables 2 and 3, respectively.
5.2. Regression results for the partial adjustment model
Table 4 reports the regression results for the symmetric, non-threshold partial adjustment model of leverage given by Eq. (3).
Panel A reports the short-run dynamics, including the short-run coefficients, the speed of adjustment, and standard diagnostic
tests (i.e., the AR(2) and Sargan tests) while Panel B contains the long-run coefficients on the determinants of target leverage. 18
We employ two consistent estimators, AH-IV and GMM and report their regression results in the respective columns in the
table. 19 Overall, the AH-IV and GMM regression results are reasonable as the AR(2) and Sargan tests of no second-order serial
correlation and valid instruments cannot be rejected at conventional significance levels, and the estimated (long-run) coefficients
are statistically significant with the expected signs. 20 The speed of adjustment is estimated at 53% and 59%, respectively by AH-IV
and GMM. These results suggest that UK firms can close more than a half of their deviation from target leverage within a year.
Using the concept of half-life, this suggests that UK firms only need between 0.91 and 0.76 years to halve their deviation from
target leverage. These speeds are consistent with the previously reported UK results (Dang, 2011; Ozkan, 2001) but faster than
the speeds estimated for US firms (Flannery and Rangan, 2006; Huang and Ritter, 2009; Lemmon et al., 2008).
Next, we turn to the AH-IV and GMM results regarding the long-run coefficients reported in Panel B. Growth opportunities
have a significantly negative effect on leverage, which is consistent with the prediction that high-growth firms lower leverage in
order to mitigate the under-investment problem (Myers, 1977). The impact of profitability on target leverage is significantly
negative, which is consistent with the prior empirical evidence (Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Titman and Wessels, 1988), and
supportive of both the pecking order theory (Myers, 1984; Myers and Majluf, 1984) and the dynamic trade-off theory (e.g.,
Strebulaev, 2007). The coefficient on tangibility is significantly positive, which is in line with the trade-off view that tangibility
16 In the empirical section below, we ﬁnd that the asymmetric speeds of adjustment range between 0.5 and 0.8, and that the difference between them is mostly
greater than 0.1, e.g., ranging between 0.113 and 0.325.
17 As in previous UK studies (e.g., Dang, 2011), a large number of observations were dropped due to the unavailability of data in ﬁrms' cash ﬂow statements.
18 Throughout the empirical analysis, we follow the literature (e.g., Ozkan, 2001) and include (strictly exogenous) time effects to control for macroeconomic and
global effects, e.g., changes in the state of the economy, interest rates and prices, accounting standards and other regulations.
19 We have also experimented with the (least-squares) POLS and FE estimators, which in theory provide biased estimates of the speed of adjustment and
consequently the long-run coefﬁcients. Indeed, (unreported) results show that the POLS estimate of the speed of adjustment seems to be downward biased while
the FE estimate appears to contain an upward bias.
20 Recently, Antoniou et al. (2008) and Lemmon et al. (2008) have suggested employing the Blundell and Bond (1998) SYSGMM to address the weak
instruments problem of the GMM estimator. This method is mostly useful when the dependent variable, leverage in this context, is close to a random walk
process Blundell and Bond (1998). As documented by Frank and Goyal (2007), however, corporate capital structure in the US has been remarkably stable over the
last half century. Our unreported analysis shows that the aggregate UK leverage ratio has also been stable over our sample period. Unless there is a way of
choosing an optimal set of instruments for alternative GMM estimators, the SYSGMM that employs more instruments than the GMM is likely to suffer from more
severe over-ﬁtting bias problems, especially in small samples Zilak (1997). We have adopted SYSGMM in empirical analysis but found that the Sargan test
strongly rejects the validity of the instruments used. For all these reasons, we do not consider the SYSGMM estimator in the paper.
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can be used as a security to avoid the asset substitution problem and reduce the agency costs of debt (e.g., Frank and Goyal, 2007).
The coefficient on non-debt tax shields is significantly negative, supporting the hypothesis that non-debt tax shields are a
substitute for the tax benefits of debt so firms with high non-debt tax shields should have less debt (DeAngelo and Masulis, 1980).
Firm size has a significantly positive coefficient, which is in line with the prediction that large firms face low bankruptcy, agency
and transaction costs and thus have easier access to debt financing (Frank and Goyal, 2007). In sum, the results for the long-run
coefficients are empirically plausible and consistent with the trade-off framework.
The results discussed so far assume that firms undertake capital structure adjustments at the same rate toward a
homogeneous target leverage ratio. We now turn to discuss the main empirical results obtained from the proposed dynamic panel
threshold model of leverage, Eq. (4).
5.3. Regression results for the threshold partial adjustment model
Table 5 presents the results from the two-step GMM estimation of the threshold partial adjustment model, Eq. (4), for three
transition variables financing imbalance, growth opportunities and firm investment. Firms are classified into the low (high)
regime when the value of the transition variable is less than or equal to (greater than) the estimated threshold value. Panel A
reports the short-run dynamics, namely the coefficients on lagged leverage and the determinants of leverage, as well as the Wald
test statistics for the null hypothesis of (individual) short-run symmetry. 21 It also reports the implied speeds of adjustment, the
threshold value and its confidence interval, as well as the (bootstrap-based) Wald test for the threshold effect (one versus two
regimes). Further, this panel contains the conventional AR(2) and Sargan test statistics, which allow us to check the validity of the
instruments used in the GMM regressions. It is worth noting that throughout the empirical analysis below, both tests are not
rejected at the 5% significance level, suggesting that all GMM regressions use valid instruments. 22 Panel B of the table reports the
long-run coefficients and the Wald test statistics under the null of long-run symmetry. Note that these tests enable us to shed
light on the interesting question of whether firms in different regimes adjust toward heterogeneous target leverage. Finally, in
Panel C, we report several important characteristics of firms being classified into the low and high regimes. In particular, we
examine the mechanisms (i.e., equity versus debt financing) in which firms adjust their capital structure toward target leverage.
5.3.1. Financing imbalance
The bootstrap-based regime test statistic in Panel A, column (1) first indicates that the null of one regime can be convincingly
rejected such that there exists a threshold effect conditional on firms' financing imbalance. This finding is consistent with the
evidence of short-run asymmetries in several coefficients (i.e., tangibility, non-debt tax shields, growth and firm size) and more
importantly, in the speed of adjustment. Indeed, firms with higher financing imbalance have a faster speed of adjustment than
those with lower imbalance: the former firms adjust at a rate of 75%, compared to the rate of 50% for the latter firms. The
difference in the two adjustment speeds of nearly 25% is both statistically and economically significant. Moreover, the threshold
value is estimated at 0.07, at the 78th percentile of the distribution of the (regime-switching) variable financing imbalance. This
finding suggests that consistent with our prediction, the sign of the imbalance does matter. Specifically, firms with a large
financing deficit have a quicker speed of adjustment than those with a small deficit or a financing surplus. It is consistent with the
21 Under two regimes, this Wald statistic follows the asymptotic χ12 distribution.
22 As in a previous footnote, although our econometric framework allows for a straightforward extension using the (Blundell and Bond, 1998) SYSGMM, we do
not consider this estimator here because in unreported tests, the validity of the SYSGMM instruments is always rejected at the 1% level. The over-ﬁtting bias
problem appears to be even more serious in dynamic panel threshold models.
Table 1
Rejection probability of the bootstrap-based Wald test in dynamic panel threshold models. This table reports the probability of rejecting the null of no threshold
effects (one regime) in dynamic panel threshold models by using the bootstrap-based Wald test statistic as described in Section 4.2.1. The probability is evaluated
based on 1,000 replications of regression, Eq. (25) (the threshold partial adjustment model) at the 5% and 1% significance levels. The coefficients are estimated by
the two-step first-difference GMM estimator and the threshold value is estimated through a grid search over the range between the 15th and 85th percentiles of
the transition variable. Simulated data are generated by Eq. (25) with the parameters set as follows: (δ1,β1,ρ,μq,σu,σv,κ)=(0.5,1,0.5,0,1,1,3) with T=10 and
N=(100,200). Two forms of variance are considered in Eq. (28), namely homoscedasticity (a=0) and heteroscedasticity (a=0.3). The unit long-run variance is
set such that w=1−a. For each realization of the sample size (N,T), T+10 time period observations are generated and then the first 10 observations are
discarded. Experimented parameter values are specified in the first column.
Error variance Homoscedasticity Heteroscedasticity
Signiﬁcance level 5% 1% 5% 1%
Number of observations 100 200 100 200 100 200 100 200
(δ2,β2) H0 :ϕ1=ϕ2,π1=π2
(0.2,0.7) 0.991 1.000 0.971 1.000 0.987 1.000 0.963 1.000
(0.3,0.8) 0.885 0.995 0.773 0.973 0.901 0.988 0.809 0.969
(0.4,0.9) 0.422 0.678 0.261 0.514 0.449 0.708 0.265 0.547
(0.5,1.0) 0.043 0.053 0.016 0.019 0.055 0.058 0.019 0.020
(0.6,1.1) 0.356 0.633 0.194 0.469 0.325 0.627 0.166 0.474
(0.7,1.2) 0.792 0.965 0.650 0.907 0.801 0.956 0.648 0.926
(0.8,1.3) 0.960 0.998 0.890 0.993 0.938 1.000 0.869 0.996
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argument that firms having more pressure and/or more incentive to cover their financing deficit undertake quicker adjustment,
and is in line with recent international evidence on the asymmetric impact of firms' financing deficit and surplus on their speed of
capital structure adjustment (Dang et al., 2011).
The results in Panel B show that the long-run coefficients are generally significant with the expected signs (except for non-debt
tax shields and profitability in the high regime). Further, these coefficients appear to differ in magnitude between the two groups
of firms. Specifically, the effects of asset tangibility and non-debt tax shields are significantly stronger for firms with low financing
imbalance than for those with high imbalance. The effects of profitability and growth opportunities are also different, albeit only at
10%. Taken together with the results in Panel A, these findings suggest that not only firms with different levels of financing
imbalance adjust their capital structure at different rates but they also adjust toward different long-run target leverage ratios. In
short, conditional on firms' financing imbalance, there is evidence of both short-run and long-run asymmetries in capital structure
adjustment.
The results in Panel C confirm that firms adjusting relatively quickly have a large and positive financing deficit (0.21) while those
adjusting relatively slowly have a surplus (−0.03), which is consistent with the results regarding the threshold value reported in
Panel A. Further, the former firms have a positive deviation from target leverage, indicating they are on average over-levered. 23 This
observation is consistentwith the recentUS evidence that over-levered firms tend tomake fast adjustment to avoid the large financial
distress/bankruptcy costs associated with having above-target leverage (Byoun, 2008). The statistics on firms' external financing
decisions show that these firms issue both debt and equity to cover their financing deficit, although they rely considerably more on
net equity issues than net debt issues (0.20 versus 0.07). Note that this financing pattern is consistentwith target adjustment behavior
because through equity issues, over-levered firms can reduce their leverage from the above-target level.
5.3.2. Growth opportunities
In column (2), the joint (regime) test of homogeneous short-run coefficients is rejected at 1%, thus strongly suggesting the
presence of a threshold effect conditional on firms' growth opportunities. Further, the results show that low-growth and high-growth
firms adjust toward their target leverage at the rates of 54% and 70%, respectively. This finding appears to support our earlier
prediction that high-growth firms undertake faster leverage adjustment thanks to their frequent visits to the capital markets, which
in turn provide themwithmore opportunities to find an appropriatemix of debt and equity. Surprisingly, however, these two speeds
of adjustment are not statistically different from each other according to the test statistic. This mixed finding may reflect the
theoretically ambiguous relation between growth opportunities and capital structure adjustments discussed earlier.
In Panel B, there is some evidence that low-growth and high-growth firms have heterogeneous target leverage as the long-run
coefficients seem to be relatively larger in magnitude for the former firms. In particular, the effects of growth opportunities and
firm size are both economically and statistically stronger for low-growth firms than for their high-growth counterparts. The
results regarding the differential effects of growth opportunities indicate that firms are more concerned about free cash flow
problems, which are most relevant for low-growth, cash rich firms (Jensen, 1986), than about underinvestment incentives, which
are likely to arise in the presence of high growth opportunities (Myers, 1977). On the other hand, the weaker impact of firm size
on target leverage for high-growth firms may be explained by the tendency of these firms to eschew debt in order to avoid the
debt overhang problem. Overall, we find some statistical evidence for long-run asymmetries and heterogeneity in target leverage
but not for short-run asymmetry in the speed of adjustment. Put it differently, firms with low- and high-growth opportunities
may adjust toward heterogeneous leverage targets, albeit at homogeneous rates.
The results in Panel C reveal that low-growth and high-growth firms have different characteristics. Most notably, high-growth
firms are over-levered with a financing deficit, which they offset by making relatively large (net) equity issues. These characteristics
are similar to those of firms with high financing imbalance, i.e. those that have a fast speed of adjustment in column (1).
23 The variable deviation is equal to the actual leverage ratio (‘it) less the estimated target leverage ratio (‘^it ¼ β^ ′xit with β^ being the long-run coefﬁcients
estimated from (4)).
Table 2
Variable definitions. This table describes the proxies for the variables considered in the paper. The data set is a panel of UK firms collected from Datastream and
consists of 859 companies and Comma required: 5,393 firm-year observations over the period 1996–2003.
Variables Deﬁnitions
Leverage Total debt to the market value of equity plus the book value of debt
(Asset) Tangibility Fixed assets to total assets
Growth opportunities The market value of equity plus the book value of debt to total assets
Profitability Earnings Before Interest and Depreciation (EBITD) to total assets
Non-debt tax shields Depreciation to total assets
Size Log of total assets in 1995 prices
Investment Capital expenditures less depreciation divided by fixed assets
Deviation Actual leverage less (estimated) target leverage
Net debt issued Net debt issued to the firm's market value
Net equity issued Net equity issued to the firm's market value
Financing imbalance Minus Cash flow after tax plus Net investment (incl. Capital Expenditures, Acquisitions and Disposals) plus Dividends plus
Net change in cash including changes in working capital, all divided by the firm's market value
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5.3.3. Firm investment
It can be seen from Panel A, column (3) that the bootstrap-based regime test cannot be rejected, suggesting that there is no
threshold effect conditional on firm investment. This finding is possibly driven by the lack of short-run asymmetries in the coefficients
on the determinants of leverage. Indeed, individual test results confirm that all coefficients are not statistically different between the
two groups of firms, at the 5% level. However, the speed of adjustment seems to be faster for firms with large investment (77%) than
for those with small investment (59%). Importantly, the difference in the speeds (18%) is not only economically significant but also
statistically significant. This finding is thus inconsistent with the prediction that firms facing potential financial constraints due to
large spending on investment projects should have a slow speed of adjustment. On the other hand, it seems to support the argument
Table 4
Regression results for the partial adjustment model of leverage. This table presents the regression and test results for the one-stage partial adjustment models of
leverage given by Eq. (3). AH-IV stands for the Anderson–Hsiao just-identified instrumental variable estimator, where leverage lagged by two periods is used as
an instrument for the first-difference of leverage lagged by one period. GMM refers to the two-step GMM estimator with Windmeijer's (2005) small-sample
correction being applied to the computation of the two-step GMM standard errors. AR(2) test is a test for second-order serial correlation, and is asymptotically
distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. Sargan test is a test for the validity of instruments and is asymptotically distributed as χ2 under the
null of valid instruments. Figures in () are the standard errors of the coefficients and those in [] are the p-values of the test statistics. All coefficients are significant
at the 1% level. See also Table 2 for variable definitions. All computations are carried out using Stata; the AH-IV and GMM estimates are obtained using Stata
module xtabond2 (Roodman, 2009), which is non-commercially downloadable through Statistical Software Components (SSC). All program modules available
upon request.
Independent Expected Partial adjustment model
variables sign AH-IV GMM
Panel A. Short-run dynamics
Leverage (t−1) + 0.470 0.403
(0.068) (0.074)
Tangibility (t) 0.241 0.231
(0.049) (0.050)
Non-debt tax shields (t) −0.649 −0.549
(0.225) (0.225)
Profitability (t) −0.124 −0.115
(0.017) (0.017)
Growth opportunities (t) −0.009 −0.008
(0.002) (0.002)
Size (t) 0.050 0.051
(0.009) (0.009)
Speed of adjustment 0.530 0.597
Number of observations 3,673 3,673
Time dummies Yes Yes
AR(2) test −1.48[0.14] −1.51[0.13]
Sargan test 23.82[0.25]
Panel B. Long-run coefficients
Tangibility (t) + 0.455 0.387
(0.116) (0.099)
Non-debt tax shields (t) −/+ −1.224 −0.920
(0.506) (0.433)
Profitability (t) +/− −0.234 −0.193
(0.046) (0.038)
Growth opportunities (t) − −0.017 −0.014
(0.004) (0.004)
Size (t) + 0.095 0.086
(0.021) (0.018)
Table 3
Descriptive statistics. The data set consists of a panel of 859 UK firms with 5,393 firm-year observations over the period 1996–2003. To minimize the effects of
extreme outliers, we follow the literature and winsorize each variable at the 1st and 99th percentiles. See Table 2 for variable definitions.
Variables Mean Stdev. Min Med. Max Skew. Kurt.
Leverage 0.200 0.199 0.000 0.146 0.990 1.104 3.750
Asset tangibility 0.310 0.243 0.000 0.256 0.997 0.846 2.903
Non-debt tax shields 0.039 0.031 0.000 0.033 0.204 1.947 8.816
Profitability 0.014 0.266 −1.495 0.079 0.446 −3.213 16.255
Growth 2.043 2.216 0.188 1.363 20.000 4.556 30.326
Size 11.189 2.105 1.609 11.012 18.961 0.343 3.167
Investment 0.043 0.665 −3.710 0.022 3.840 0.125 23.768
Financing imbalance 0.024 0.143 −0.690 0.001 0.645 0.296 10.049
Net debt issued −0.005 0.097 −0.540 −0.001 0.358 −1.167 11.891
Net equity issued 0.054 0.169 −0.175 0.001 1.133 3.926 20.030
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that large capital expenditures that require external fundsmay provide firmswith opportunities to choose an appropriatemix of new
debt and equity in order to quickly move toward their optimal capital structure.
The results in Panel B suggest that firms with small investment and those with large investment may consider heterogeneous
leverage targets. The long-run coefficients are generally larger in magnitude for firms in the low regime than for those in the high
regime. In particular, the effects of profitability and firm size on target leverage are statistically different for these two groups of
firms. The stronger inverse relation between profitability and target leverage for firms in the low regime can be explained by the
fact that firms with limited capital expenditures may not need to use (external) debt, especially when they are profitable and
have retained earnings.
Our further analysis of the firm-specific characteristics in Panel C suggests that firms classified as having more investment,
i.e., those belonging to the high regime and have a faster speed of adjustment, tend to have a significantly higher financing deficit,
which they then offset by issuing both debt and equity. This pattern is clearly consistent with the argument above that firms with
large capital expenditures have more opportunities to adjust leverage thanks to their visits to the capital markets. Moreover, the
results also show that these firms' leverage adjustment is mainly driven by (net) equity issues, rather than by debt issues, which is
in line with target adjustment behavior given that they have above-target leverage (as indicated by a positive deviation) and thus
little incentive to issue additional debt.
Table 5
Regression results for threshold partial adjustment models of leverage conditional on financing imbalance, growth opportunities or investment. This table
presents the regression and test results for the threshold partial adjustment model, Eq. (4), where the transition variable is financing imbalance, growth
opportunities or investment. All models are estimated in first differences and include time-specific dummies. GMM refers to the two-step GMM estimator,
Eq. (14). The threshold value is obtained through a grid search over the range between the 15th and 85th percentiles of the transition variable. The confidence
interval for the threshold parameter estimate is obtained using Hansen's (1999) approach. AR(2) test is a test for the second-order serial correlation, and is
asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. Sargan test is a test for the validity of instruments and is asymptotically distributed as
χ2 under the null of valid instruments. Regime test is a sup-Wald test statistic for the null hypothesis of no threshold effects, Eq. (18); its p-value is evaluated by a
bootstrap-based procedure as described in Section 4.2.1. Column Test presents the Wald test statistics and p-values from χ2 under the null of individual short-run
or long-run symmetry in Panels A and B while in Panel C it presents the p-values of the t-statistics under the null of no mean differences. Figures in () are the
standard errors of the coefficients and those in [] are the p-values of the statistics. See also Table 2 for variable definitions.
Transition variable (1) Financing imbalance (2) Growth opportunities (3) Investment
Independent variables Exp. sign Low High Test Low High Test Low High Test
Panel A. Short-run dynamics
Leverage (t−1) + 0.496 0.249 16.170 0.461 0.300 1.943 0.410 0.229 8.700
(0.090) (0.094) [0.000] (0.074) (0.099) [0.163] (0.090) (0.094) [0.003]
Tangibility (t) 0.233 0.262 1.203 0.170 0.208 0.924 0.225 0.265 2.130
(0.053) (0.073) [0.000] (0.051) (0.054) [0.336] (0.053) (0.073) [0.144]
Non-debt tax shields (t) −0.619 −0.052 5.621 0.040 −0.454 1.955 −0.614 −0.554 0.097
(0.230) (0.493) [0.018] (0.244) (0.234) [0.162] (0.230) (0.493) [0.755]
Profitability (t) −0.095 −0.089 0.056 −0.187 −0.113 1.590 −0.134 −0.095 3.487
(0.022) (0.197) [0.813] (0.018) (0.054) [0.207] (0.022) (0.197) [0.062]
Growth opportunities (t) −0.007 −0.018 6.463 −0.126 −0.007 5.007 −0.007 −0.008 0.582
(0.002) (0.002) [0.011] (0.002) (0.002) [0.025] (0.002) (0.002) [0.446]
Size (t) 0.028 0.035 31.414 0.062 0.050 7.854 0.057 0.058 1.843
(0.010) (0.010) [0.000] (0.010) (0.010) [0.005] (0.010) (0.010) [0.175]
Speed of adjustment 0.504 0.751 0.539 0.700 0.590 0.771
Threshold (%) 0.0703 (78%) 0.9140 (17%) 0.0733 (51%)
95% Confidence interval [0.0697,0.0706] [0.9133,0.9141] [0.0731,0.0735]
Number of observations 4,205 1,184 917 4,472 3,505 1,884
Regime test 116.221 [0.000] 95.628 [0.000] 14.371 [0.215]
Sargan 38.185 [0.507] 36.955 [0.563] 39.594 [0.488]
AR(2) −1.345 [0.179] −1.683 [0.092] −1.239 [0.215]
Panel B. Long-run coefficients
Tangibility (t) + 0.463 0.349 3.836 0.315 0.297 0.073 0.381 0.343 0.798
(0.087) (0.097) [0.050] (0.093) (0.075) [0.787] (0.087) (0.097) [0.372]
Non-debt tax shields (t) −/+ −1.228 −0.069 5.527 0.075 −0.649 1.223 −1.039 −0.718 1.114
(0.389) (0.705) [0.019] (0.424) (0.342) [0.269] (0.389) (0.705) [0.291]
Profitability (t) +/− −0.187 −0.118 2.739 −0.346 −0.162 1.596 −0.227 −0.123 8.403
(0.043) (0.313) [0.098] (0.035) (0.073) [0.206] (0.043) (0.313) [0.004]
Growth opportunities (t) − −0.014 −0.024 3.002 −0.233 −0.010 4.288 −0.011 −0.011 0.002
(0.005) (0.002) [0.083] (0.004) (0.002) [0.038] (0.005) (0.002) [0.964]
Size (t) + 0.055 0.047 1.612 0.114 0.071 4.021 0.096 0.076 6.208
(0.019) (0.016) [0.204] (0.017) (0.015) [0.045] (0.019) (0.016) [0.013]
Panel C. Firm characteristics
Deviation −0.02 0.06 [0.00] −0.09 0.02 [0.00] −0.04 0.08 [0.00]
Financing imbalance −0.03 0.21 [0.00] 0.00 0.03 [0.00] 0.00 0.06 [0.00]
Net debt issued −0.03 0.07 [0.00] −0.02 0.00 [0.00] −0.02 0.02 [0.00]
Net equity issued 0.01 0.20 [0.00] 0.01 0.06 [0.00] 0.03 0.09 [0.00]
478 V.A. Dang et al. / Journal of Empirical Finance 19 (2012) 465–482
We next turn to Table 6, which reports the regression and test results for the threshold partial adjustment model (4) using the
remaining transition variables, namely profitability, firm size and volatility. The format of this table is similar to that of Table 5
described above.
5.3.4. Proﬁtability
In Panel A, column (1), the bootstrap-based regime test suggests a threshold effect as the null of one regime is rejected at 5%.
On closer inspection, however, we find almost no evidence of short-run asymmetries as the individual (short-run) coefficients are
not statistically different between firms in the two regimes (except for growth opportunities). Next, the implied speeds of
adjustment for firms with low and high profitability are 64% and 74%, respectively, which appears to support the argument that
firms with low profitability are highly levered and so have more incentive to revert to target leverage in order to avoid financial
distress. Nevertheless, these speeds are faster than the estimated speed in the linear model reported in Table 4 while the
difference in these speeds (of 10%) is not statistically significant.
In Panel B, there is evidence of long-run asymmetries in the impact of tangibility and growth opportunities on target leverage,
although surprisingly there is no such evidence for profitability. Overall, firms with low and high profitability may adjust toward
heterogeneous target leverage (i.e., long-run asymmetries), although there is no statistical evidence in favor of short-run
symmetries. Finally, in Panel C, the characteristics of the two groups of firms with different levels of profitability are significantly
different (except for net debt issued). Compared to the results from Table 5, firms that appear to adjust at a quick rater, i.e., highly
profitable firms, are also over-levered but have a surplus and rely on both debt and equity financing activities to cover their
imbalance.
5.3.5. Firm size
The results in column (2) show that the speeds of adjustment for small and large firms are respectively 77% and 62%, which are
faster than the speed estimated for the symmetric model discussed in Subsection 5.2. The magnitude of these speeds appears to
be consistent with the argument that due to facing lower cash flow volatility and financial distress costs as well as fewer debt
covenants, large firms have less incentive and external pressure to adjust capital structures, implying a slower speed of
adjustment. However, the test statistic shows that the difference in the two speeds of adjustment (of 15%) is not statistically
significant. Moreover, according to the regime test, there is no evidence of a threshold effect conditional on firm size, which is
further corroborated by the lack of asymmetries in the short-run coefficients on the determinants of leverage. This finding is
inconsistent with recent evidence on the relation between firm size and the speed of adjustment (Dang et al., 2011; Faulkender
et al., 2012). Note however that in Panel B, there is almost no evidence of long-run asymmetries, except for tangibility, which has
a statistically different impact on target leverage for small and large firms. The effects of profitability and growth are only
marginally different at 10%. Taken together, the results regarding firm size do not provide evidence for short-run and long-run
asymmetries in any meaningful sense.
5.3.6. Volatility
The results in column (3) provide strong evidence of joint short-run asymmetries, as the bootstrap-based regime test is
rejected at 5%. More importantly, this finding is driven by the heterogeneity in the speed of adjustment alone because there is no
evidence of significant asymmetries in the remaining short-run coefficients. Indeed, firms with low and high earnings volatility
adjust at different rates (67% versus 56%) and although the difference in these speeds is only 11%, it is statistically significant at 1%.
This finding is consistent with the prediction that firms with low earnings volatility face a lower cost of capital and so have more
scope to undertake capital structure adjustment.
In Panel B, there is some weak evidence of long-run asymmetries as only firm size has a differential impact on target leverage
for the two groups of firms. Firm size may matter more for firms with volatile earnings possibly because these firms may face high
(fixed) costs of capital and have limited access to debt financing. Finally, in Panel C, the results show that firms that adjust more
quickly (i.e., those with low volatility) are over-levered and have a financing deficit. Although these firms retire debt, they mainly
rely on (net) equity issues to reduce their above-target leverage, consistent with target adjustment behavior. These
characteristics are generally similar to those documented for firms that adjust with a relatively quick speed in Table 5.
5.3.7. Discussion and summary of results
The results above combine to provide a complex, yet interesting picture of firms' asymmetric capital structure adjustments in
both the short and long run. Overall, we are able to identify two distinct sets of results. The first set consists of cases where the
transition variable used is either financing imbalance, investment or volatility. The common finding in these cases is that there are
significant asymmetries in both the speed of adjustment and the long-run target leverage relationships. 24 Indeed, firms having
large financing imbalance (or a deficit), large investment or low earnings volatility adjust at statistically quicker rates than those
with the opposite characteristics. In terms of the long-run coefficients, their signs are empirically plausible, the same as in the
symmetric partial adjustment model discussed in Subsection 5.2. More importantly, the effects of tangibility, profitability and firm
size on target leverage tend to be relatively stronger for firms that adjust with a relatively slower speed. This finding may shed
24 Growth opportunities may also be added to this group, though there is no statistical evidence of heterogeneity in the speed of adjustment for this case. Also
recall that for ﬁrm investment, the regime test does not suggest a threshold effect, possibly due to a lack of short-run asymmetries in the coefﬁcients on the
determinants of leverage. Hence, the results for this transition variable should also be treated with care.
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light on a possible relation between the short-run and long-run adjustment mechanisms, i.e., the speed of adjustment seems to be
inversely proportional to the size of the adjustment in (long-run) target leverage as proxied by the effects of the determinants of
such target. Next, we also document a consistent pattern about firms having faster speeds of adjustment: these firms are
significantly over-levered with a financing deficit and a considerably large (positive) deviation from their target leverage. 25
Moreover, these firms revert to target leverage mainly via equity issues, which is consistent with target adjustment behavior.
The second set of results consists of two cases with the transition variable being either profitability or firm size. In both cases,
we find no statistical evidence of asymmetry in the speed of adjustment. Moreover, compared to the regression results for the
linear model in Subsection 5.2, the estimated speeds of adjustment are both faster than the (symmetric) speed of adjustment in
the linear model. Empirically, one should expect the parameters in the symmetric model to be close to the weighted means of
those in the low and high regimes; yet we find contrasting evidence here. Hence, the results regarding the estimated adjustment
speeds should be treated with great caution. Note that this finding is inconsistent with recent research (Dang et al., 2011;
Faulkender et al., 2012) that documents significant asymmetry in the speed of adjustment conditional on profitability and firm
size. One possible explanation for our different finding is that unlike previous studies, we adopt the one-stage estimation
Table 6
Regression results for threshold partial adjustmentmodels of leverage conditional on profitability, size or volatility. This table presents the regression and test results for
the threshold partial adjustment model, Eq. (4), where the transition variable is profitability, firm size, or volatility. All models are estimated in first differences and
include time-specific dummies. GMMrefers to the two-stepGMMestimator, Eq. (14). The threshold value is obtained through a grid search over the range between the
15th and 85th percentiles of the transition variable. The confidence interval for the threshold parameter estimate is obtained using Hansen's (1999) approach. AR(2)
test is a test for the second-order serial correlation, and is asymptotically distributed asN(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. Sargan test is a test for the validity
of instruments and is asymptotically distributed asχ2 under the null of valid instruments. Regime test is a sup-Wald test statistic for the null hypothesis of no threshold
effects, (18); its p-value is evaluated by a bootstrap-based procedure as described in Section 4.2.1. Column Test presents the Wald test statistics and p-values from χ2
under the null of individual short-run or long-run symmetry in Panels A and B while in Panel C it presents the p-values of the t-statistics under the null of no mean
differences. Figures in () are the standard errors of the coefficients and those in [] are the p-values of the statistics. See also Table 2 for variable definitions.
Transition variable (4) Proﬁtability (5) Size (6) Volatility
Independent variables Exp. sign Low High Test Low High Test Low High Test
Panel A. Short-run dynamics
Leverage (t−1) + 0.362 0.257 1.222 0.226 0.379 0.658 0.329 0.442 6.655
(0.074) (0.099) [0.269] (0.090) (0.094) [0.417] (0.088) (0.063) [0.010]
Tangibility (t) 0.233 0.174 2.252 0.101 0.266 4.100 0.237 0.207 2.424
(0.051) (0.054) [0.133] (0.053) (0.073) [0.043] (0.049) (0.059) [0.119]
Non-debt tax shields (t) −0.435 −0.388 0.042 −0.239 −0.833 2.228 −0.560 −0.429 0.716
(0.244) (0.234) [0.838] (0.230) (0.493) [0.136] (0.230) (0.352) [0.397]
Profitability (t) −0.103 −0.149 0.501 −0.085 −0.151 3.425 −0.123 −0.091 2.626
(0.018) (0.054) [0.479] (0.022) (0.197) [0.064] (0.017) (0.025) [0.105]
Growth opportunities (t) −0.010 −0.003 13.528 −0.005 −0.009 2.265 −0.009 −0.006
(0.002) (0.002) [0.000] (0.002) (0.002) [0.132] (0.002) (0.002) [0.233]
Size (t) 0.048 0.047 0.325 0.052 0.048 1.075 0.051 0.050 0.590
(0.010) (0.010) [0.569] (0.010) (0.010) [0.200] (0.009) (0.010) [0.442]
Speed of adjustment 0.638 0.743 0.774 0.621 0.671 0.558
Threshold 0.1628 (78%) 9.1050 (15%) 0.0801 (51%)
95% Confidence interval [0.1626,0.1629] [9.1049,9.1097] [0.0752,0.0848]
Number of observations 4,528 861 809 4,580 3,288 2,101
Regime test 36.215 [0.012] 10.415 [0.779] 24.217 [0.013]
Sargan 35.229 [0.643] 44.659 [0.282] 39.042 [0.513]
AR(2) −1.733 [0.083] −1.657 [0.097] −1.778 [0.075]
Panel B. Long-run coefficients
Tangibility (t) + 0.365 0.235 4.199 0.131 0.428 5.588 0.353 0.372 0.334
(0.093) (0.075) [0.040] (0.087) (0.097) [0.018] (0.086) (0.079) [0.563]
Non-debt tax shields (t) −/+ −0.681 −0.522 0.218 −0.309 −1.341 2.038 −0.835 −0.770 0.056
(0.424) (0.342) [0.641] (0.389) (0.705) [0.153] (0.400) (0.462) [0.813]
Profitability (t) +/− −0.161 −0.201 0.170 −0.110 −0.243 3.089 −0.184 −0.163 0.349
(0.035) (0.073) [0.680] (0.043) (0.313) [0.079] (0.042) (0.034) [0.555]
Growth opportunities (t) − −0.015 −0.004 15.419 −0.006 −0.015 3.053 −0.014 −0.011 0.323
(0.004) (0.002) [0.000] (0.005) (0.002) [0.081] (0.004) (0.003) [0.570]
Size (t) + 0.075 0.063 1.637 0.067 0.078 0.406 0.076 0.090 4.774
(0.017) (0.015) [0.201] (0.019) (0.016) [0.524] (0.018) (0.013) [0.029]
Panel C. Firm characteristics
Deviation −0.01 0.05 [0.00] 0.03 −0.01 [0.00] 0.04 −0.06 [0.00]
Financing imbalance 0.03 −0.01 [0.00] 0.05 0.02 [0.00] 0.02 0.04 [0.00]
Net debt issued 0.00 −0.01 [0.15] −0.01 0.00 [0.02] −0.01 0.00 [0.00]
Net equity issued 0.06 0.02 [0.00] 0.15 0.04 [0.00] 0.05 0.07 [0.00]
25 Using the (absolute) deviation from target leverage as a transition variable could be useful for verifying this ﬁnding, although such an approach is not
permitted in our current modeling that assumes exogenous transition variables. We leave this issue for future research.
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procedure allowing for asymmetries in long-run target leverage relationships. For example, we document some evidence of
heterogeneity in target leverage in that there are significantly different effects of tangibility and size on long-run target leverage
for firms with relatively slow speeds of adjustment (at least in terms of magnitude).
To sum up, the above discussions indicate that using the first group of variables, namely financing imbalance, investment and
volatility, as the regime-switching variable provides reasonable empirical evidence of (short-run and long-run) asymmetries in
capital structure adjustments. In contrast, profitability and firm size do not seem to be good candidates for the regime-switching
transition variable.
6. Conclusions
The (dynamic) trade-off theory of capital structure implies that firms facing differential adjustment costs may follow different
paths toward their target leverage. This paper proposes a new empirical approach to test this prediction by modeling short-run
and long-run asymmetries in capital structure adjustments. Specifically, our testing framework entertains a possibility that firms
may adjust at different rates toward heterogeneous leverage targets. In terms of methods, we have advanced a dynamic panel
threshold model of leverage and developed appropriate econometric techniques to consistently estimate the speeds of
adjustment in different regimes associated with differential adjustment costs. We have also provided a valid bootstrap-based
procedure to test for the threshold effect.
We have documented some evidence of asymmetries in firms' adjustment toward target leverage. Firms with large financing
imbalance (or a deficit), large capital expenditures or low earnings volatility have a significantly faster speed of adjustment than those
with the opposite characteristics. Further, we provide some evidence of long-run asymmetries that not only do firms with such
characteristics adjust at different rates, but they also seem to adjust toward heterogeneous leverage targets. Firms that have a
significantly faster speed of adjustment possess important characteristics: they are significantly over-levered with a financing deficit.
These firms then revert to their target leverage and offset their deficit mainly via equity issues rather than by debt issues/retirements.
This finding suggests that firms tend to make quicker adjustment to avoid the potentially large financial distress costs caused by
having above-target leverage, which is consistent with the dynamic trade-off theory.
On the other hand, conditional on profitability and firm size, two commonly used proxies for adjustment costs, we find no
evidence of short-run asymmetry in the speed of adjustment and only limited evidence in favor of long-run asymmetries.
Noticeably, in both cases, the estimated speeds of adjustment in the low and high regimes are always faster than the speed of
adjustment estimated for the linear model. This, therefore, suggests that using profitability and firm size as the transition variable
in our regime-switching framework may not produce sensible empirical results.
A few words of caution are in order. While the empirical framework developed in our paper is capable of examining the
validity of the dynamic trade-off theory, it does not directly test the predictions of alternative views of capital structure such as
the pecking order theory, the market timing and inertia hypotheses. Our approach to estimating target leverage follows the
convention in the capital structure literature so it may be subject to potential empirical problems, such as the presence of a mass
point at zero-leverage, non-linearity of leverage ratios and survivorship biases in firm-level panel data (e.g., Cook et al., 2008;
Welch, 2007). Further, the empirical evidence in favor of target adjustment behavior and dynamic rebalancing of leverage may be
affected by mechanical mean reversion (Chang and Dasgupta, 2009; Chen and Zhao, 2007; Shyam-Sunder and Myers, 1999), and
be consistent with both the trade-off and modified pecking order theories (Leary and Roberts, 2005). In terms of methods, our
modeling approach only allows for exogenous regime-switching in dynamic panel threshold models so it would be desirable for
future research to consider endogenous regime-switching mechanisms (Kourtellos et al., 2009).
Acknowledgements
We would like to thank two anonymous referees, Richard T. Baillie (the editor), session participants at the EFMA 2008
conference, seminar participants at Leeds University Business School (Economics and CASIF), Sung Kyun Kwan and Yonsei
Universities, and especially Michael Brennan, Charlie Cai, Yoosoon Chang, Ian Garrett, David Hillier, Kevin Keasy, Joon Park,
Krishna Paudyal, Kevin Reilly, Kasbi Salma, Myung Seo and Stephen Wilcox for their helpful comments and suggestions. Partial
financial support from the ESRC (Grant No. RES-000-22-3161) is gratefully acknowledged. The usual disclaimer applies.
References
Ahn, S.C., Schmidt, P., 1995. Efficient estimation of models for dynamic panel data. J. Econ. 68, 5–27.
Ahn, S.C., Schmidt, P., 1997. Efficient estimation of dynamic panel data models: alternative assumptions and simplified estimation. J. Econ. 76, 309–321.
Alvarez, J., Arellano, M., 2003. The time series and cross-section asymptotics of dynamic panel data estimators. Econometrica 71, 1121–1159.
Anderson, T.W., Hsiao, C., 1982. Formulation and estimation of dynamic models using panel data. J. Econ. 18, 47–82.
Andrews, D.W.K., Ploberger, W., 1994. Optimal tests when a nuisance parameter is present only under the alternative. Econometrica 62, 1383–1414.
Andrews, D.W.K., Ploberger, W., 1996. Testing for serial correlation against an ARMA(1, 1,) process. J. Am. Stat. Assoc. 91, 1331–1342.
Antoniou, A., Guney, Y., Paudyal, K., 2008. The determinants of capital structure: capital market oriented versus bank oriented institutions. J. Financ. Quant. Anal.
43, 59–92.
Arellano, M., 2003. Panel Data Econometrics: Advanced Texts in Econometrics. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Arellano, M., Bond, S.R., 1991. Some tests of specification for panel data: Monte Carlo evidence and an application to employment equations. Rev. Econ. Stud. 58,
227–297.
Arellano, M., Bover, O., 1995. Another look at the instrumental variable estimation of error components models. J. Econ. 68, 29–51.
Baker, M., Wurgler, J., 2002. Market timing and capital structure. J. Finance 57, 1–32.
481V.A. Dang et al. / Journal of Empirical Finance 19 (2012) 465–482
Blundell, R.W., Bond, S.R., 1998. Initial conditions and moment restrictions in dynamic panel data models. J. Econ. 87, 115–143.
Bradley, M., Jarrell, G.A., Kim, E.H., 1984. On the existence of an optimal capital structure: theory and evidence. J. Finance 39, 857–878.
Brennan, M.J., Schwartz, E.S., 1978. Corporate income taxes, valuation and the problem of optimal capital structure. J. Bus. 51, 103–114.
Byoun, S., 2008. How and when do firms adjust their capital structures toward targets? J. Finance 63, 3069–3096.
Caner, M., Hansen, B.E., 2004. Instrumental variable estimation of a threshold model. Econ. Theory 20, 813–843.
Chan, K.S., 1993. Consistency and limiting distribution of the least squares estimator of a threshold autoregressive model. Ann. Stat. 21, 520–533.
Chang, X., Dasgupta, S., 2009. Target behavior and financing: how conclusive is the evidence. J. Finance 64, 1767–1796.
Chen, L., Zhao, Z., 2007. Mechanical mean reversion of leverage ratios. Econ. Lett. 95, 223–229.
Cook, D.O., Kieschnick, R., McCullough, B.D., 2008. Regression analysis of proportions in finance with self selection. J. Empir. Finance 15, 860–867.
Dang, V.A., 2011. Leverage, debt maturity and firm investment: an empirical analysis. J. Bus. Finance Account. 38, 225–258.
Dang, V.A., Garrett, I., Nguyen, C., 2011. Asymmetric Partial Adjustment toward Target Leverage: International Evidence. Unpublished Manuscript, University of
Manchester.
Davies, R.B., 1987. Hypothesis testing when a nuisance parameter is present only under the alternative. Biometrika 74, 33–43.
DeAngelo, H., Masulis, R., 1980. Optimal capital structure under corporate and personal taxation. J. Financ. Econ. 8, 3–29.
Drobetz, W., Wanzenried, G., 2006. What determines the speed of adjustment to the target capital structure? Appl. Financ. Econ. 16, 941–958.
Drobetz, W., Pensa, P., Wanzenried, G., 2006. Firm Characteristics and Dynamic Capital Structure Adjustment. Unpublished Manuscript, University of Hamburg.
Everaert, G., Pozzi, L., 2007. Bootstrap-based bias correction for dynamic panels. J. Econ. Dyn. Control. 31, 1160–1184.
Fama, E.F., French, K.R., 2002. Testing trade-off and pecking order predictions about dividends and debt. Rev. Financ. Stud. 15, 1–33.
Faulkender, M.W., Flannery, M.J., Hankins, K.W., Smith, J.M., 2012. Cash Flows and Leverage Adjustments. J. Financ. Econ. 103, 632–646.
Fischer, E.O., Heinkel, R., Zechner, J., 1989. Dynamic capital structure choice: theory and tests. J. Finance 44, 19–40.
Flannery, M.J., Hankins, K.W., 2007. A Theory of Capital Structure Adjustment Speed. Unpublished Manuscript, University of Florida.
Flannery, M.J., Rangan, K.P., 2006. Partial adjustment toward target capital structures. J. Financ. Econ. 79, 469–506.
Frank, M.Z., Goyal, V.K., 2007. Trade-off and Pecking Order Theories of Debt. In: Eckbo, B.E. (Ed.), Handbook of Corporate Finance: Empirical Corporate Finance.
North Holland Handbooks of Finance. Elsevier Science.
Hahn, J., Hausman, J., Kuersteiner, G., 2007. Long difference instrumental variables estimation for dynamic panel models with fixed effects. J. Econ. 140, 574–617.
Hansen, B.E., 1996. Inference when a nuisance parameter is not identified under the null hypothesis. Econometrica 64, 413–430.
Hansen, B.E., 1999. Threshold effects in non-dynamic panels: estimation, testing and inference. J. Econ. 93, 345–368.
Hansen, B.E., 2000. Sample splitting and threshold estimation. Econometrica 68, 575–603.
Harris, M., Raviv, A., 1991. The theory of capital structure. J. Finance 46, 297–356.
Hennessy, C.A., Whited, T.M., 2006. Debt dynamics. J. Finance 60, 1129–1165.
Huang, R., Ritter, J.R., 2009. Testing theories of capital structure and estimating the speed of adjustment. J. Financ. Quant. Anal. 44, 237–271.
Jensen, M., 1986. Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance and takeovers. Am. Econ. Rev. 76, 323–339.
Kourtellos, A., Stengos, T.S., Tan, C.M., 2009. Structural Threshold Regression. Unpublished manuscript, University of Cyprus, University of Guelph and Tufts
University.
Kraus, A., Litzenberger, R.H., 1973. A state-preference model of optimal financial leverage. J. Finance 28, 911–922.
Lang, L.E., Ofek, E., Stulz, R., 1996. Leverage, investment and firm growth. J. Financ. Econ. 40, 3–29.
Leary, M.T., Roberts, M.R., 2005. Do firms rebalance their capital structures? J. Finance 60, 2575–2619.
Leland, H.E., 1994. Corporate debt value, bond covenants, and optimal capital structure. J. Finance 49, 1213–1252.
Lemmon, M.L., Roberts, M.R., Zender, J.F., 2008. Back to the beginning: persistence and the cross-section of corporate capital structure. J. Finance 63, 1575–1608.
Modigliani, F., Miller, M.H., 1958. The cost of capital, corporate finance and the theory of investment. Am. Econ. Rev. 49, 261–297.
Myers, S.C., 1977. Determinants of corporate borrowing. J. Financ. Econ. 5, 145–175.
Myers, S.C., 1984. The capital structure puzzle. J. Finance 34, 575–592.
Myers, S.C., Majluf, N.S., 1984. Corporate observe for financing imbalance, investment and financing and investments decisions when firms have information that
investors do not have. J. Financ. Econ. 13, 187–221.
Nickell, S.J., 1981. Biases in dynamic models with fixed effects. Econometrica 49, 1417–1426.
Ozkan, A., 2001. Determinants of capital structure and adjustment to long run target: evidence from UK company panel data. J. Bus. Finance Account. 28, 175–198.
Pagan, A., 1984. Econometric issues in the analysis of regressions with generated regressors. Int. Econ. Rev. 25, 221–247.
Rajan, R.G., Zingales, L., 1995. What do we know about capital structure? Some evidence from international data. J. Finance 50, 1421–1461.
Roodman, D., 2009. How to do xtabond2: an introduction to difference and system GMM in stata? Stata J. 9, 86–136.
Shyam-Sunder, L., Myers, S., 1999. Testing static trade-off against pecking order models of capital structure. J. Financ. Econ. 51, 219–244.
Strebulaev, I.A., 2007. Do tests of capital structure theory mean what they say. J. Finance 62, 1747–1787.
Titman, S., Tsyplakov, S., 2007. A dynamic model of optimal capital structure. Rev. Finance 11, 401–451.
Titman, S., Wessels, R., 1988. The determinants of capital structure choice. J. Finance 43, 1–19.
Welch, I., 2004. Capital structure and stock returns. J. Polit. Econ. 112, 106–131.
Welch, I., 2007. Common Flaws in Empirical Capital Structure Research, AFA 2008 New Orleans Meetings Paper.
Windmeijer, F., 2005. A finite sample correction for the variance of linear efficient two-step GMM estimators. J. Econ. 126, 25–51.
Zilak, J., 1997. Efficient estimation with panel data when instruments are predetermined: an empirical comparison of moment-condition estimators. J. Bus. Econ.
Stat. 15, 419–431.
482 V.A. Dang et al. / Journal of Empirical Finance 19 (2012) 465–482
